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Furthermore the ideals of the good, the true, and the beautiful must be, for Haeckel, purely human ideals, since no values exist for the universe. But if man himself has as little value as Haeckel gives him, it is strange that he should regard human ideals as worthy of reverence and worship.

A final word must be added to our criticism of mechanism. The theory of mechanism itself is not, as Haeckel must believe, a purely natural product. It is due to the organizing activity of man's intelligence and could not exist without it. Haeckel regards this unifying and critical faculty of man as due to the "concatenation of presentations."<sup>23</sup> Yet the mere concatenation of presentations could never of itself lead to the criticism and combination necessary to bind together these various sensations under the law of causation. This unifying of experience demands, as Eucken has so clearly shown, that man be able to separate himself from the chain of nature in order to combine and order the presentations that come to him. Hence the formulation of the theory of mechanism is a fact which mechanism itself fails to explain, and the very existence of the *theory* is evidence of its own inadequacy as a final explanation of all facts in the universe.

Our examination of Haeckel's philosophy has shown the lack of cogency of his denial of freedom. While this in itself furnishes no evidence for the reality of freedom, it at least frees us from many objections that are commonly raised against it. It indicates that the problem cannot be disposed of in so summary a manner by science, and thus affords ground for those who in the twentieth century, in spite of Haeckel's dictum, maintain the possibility of freedom.

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## DETERMINISM OF FREE WILL.

WITH REFERENCE TO THE PRECEDING ARTICLE.

There is a strange confusion about mechanicalism and freedom of will which seems to have been constructed by our theological school of educators on the basis of a misinterpretation of philosophical thought, and errors thus derived are still perpetuated.

The idea of the will is perhaps the fundamental conception of

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *The Riddle of the Universe*, pp. 121f.

ethics, and an important item for moral purposes is the freedom of an acting person. But "free will" is nothing mysterious nor incredible; it is that condition of a will which is not hindered by compulsion. He is free who acts on his own account, according to his own character, and is not interfered with by external circumstances which would make it impossible for him to act as he wishes. A man under compulsion is not responsible for his action; for his act is the act of some one else, or is due to the circumstances which force him against his own will. The external circumstances may be ever so indirect and may be reducible to fear. A man threatened by the consequences of the results of his act is no freer than a man who is directly forced into acting contrary to his will by facing the revolver of a highway robber. If an act is committed because the acting person wishes the act and also willingly accepts all of its consequences, it is and ought to be considered an act of free will, and there is scarcely any thinker who would not admit this definition of free will.

Is there any one who denies that the act of a free will, as here defined, is as much determined as any other event in this world in which we live? If the free act of a man is really the result of deliberation and if it is performed according to the nature of the actor's character, the result of this decision will be as necessary as the act of an unfree man who acts under compulsion according to motives of fear or any external force. Determinism is a general feature of the world which expresses the truth that the law of causation remains unbroken. According to the law of causation, everything is determined, even the act of a free man.

Yet there are, or rather have been, some theologians who believe in free will, not as free will necessarily must be, viz., an unhampered will, but as a *carte blanche* or *tabula rasa*, a cause that is not caused, or as a determinant which on its part is undetermined, which is free in the sense that it is unformed, or a factor that is somehow an exception to causation and not the product of the efficacy of causation. They think that a man is not responsible if his actions are determined or determinable and can be predicted, just as in moving pictures only such consequences will happen as are on the films, and the man who knows the film would naturally and necessarily be able to tell what is going to happen in the next moment. What an undetermined will is or would be, has never as yet been clearly described; it is only declared to be an exception to the law

of causality, and being undetermined seems to be as much a mere chance product as the haphazard cast of dies, in which case of course the actor could no longer be regarded as responsible for a deed not determined by himself.

The truth is that if we were omniscient we could predict the history of the world from step to step just as the theatrical manager of the movies knows the next act if he knows the film that is to project it on the screen. If I know all the characters of the acting persons, I will be able to predict the outcome of their activity under definite conditions, and there can be no quibbling about it.

We must not identify necessity and compulsion. Everything is determined; and all acts are determined with necessity, even the free acts of a free man. Further it would be wrong to say that man is compelled to act according to factors which are none of his making, if he necessarily acts according to his will.

It is true that there are factors which have preceded him; among them there are factors such as have determined his character. He has been determined and his will has been given him. In this sense it is claimed that he is as unfree as any slave who is not his own master. But is that not a wrong conclusion that here too identifies necessity with compulsion? It is necessary that a man should act according to his character if he is not under compulsion. The acts of a free man are necessary because his will necessarily and naturally follows the impulses of his own character. To say that we are slaves because we follow necessarily our own instincts is simply an illogical distortion of facts. The truth is that in doing what we will we obey the behest of those factors which shaped our will. However, granting that our will is not of our own making, we will be obliged to confess that we are the continuation of those factors which make us; or in other words, our ancestors whose will we incorporate are ourselves in a former generation. Thus we ought to recognize openly and unhesitatingly that the whole development of the world is not a piecing together of independent individuals, but that we are mere fragments of a continuous whole, we are pieces of a prolonged history of one and the same aspiration which may be modified, improved, or even on the other hand weakened and debased. Former generations have made us of the present age, and future generations will be as much the product of the present generation as we are of the past. Thus if we speak of having been made by prior factors we must recognize

that the factors that made us are our own existence, as we existed in former days,—yet the truth remains that a free will is definitely determined. A free will which acts in an unhampered way is as much determined as any will which suffers violence or acts under compulsion.

Miss Bussey has taken up Haeckel and criticizes him for denying freedom of will where he stands up for determinism. I do not think that Professor Haeckel will take up the cudgel and defend himself. On the other hand I grant that Professor Haeckel is an enthusiastic defender of the monistic world-conception for which he demands a strict and universal application of the mechanistic theory to all events of existence. I will not deny that Professor Haeckel sometimes accepts views which I myself would not endorse. For instance he identifies God with matter and energy while I would look upon God in contrast to matter and energy, as a religious formulation of the world order which is the ultimate *raison d'être* of natural law throughout the sphere of existence, including also the natural law that governs human society and is the basis of the rules of conduct. But this is a point which could easily be reconstructed or altered, for Professor Haeckel himself would scarcely object to it.

In order to understand Haeckel one ought to interpret his writings in the spirit in which he has written them, and ought not imply mistakes which are rather incidental points, such as Miss Bussey criticizes.

Miss Bussey in criticizing Professor Haeckel should consider that he rejects the theory of free will because he understands by free will the theological conception of an undetermined will, viz., that kind of a free will that does not exist, because it is a self-contradictory notion, an impossible and foolish conception of a misguided brain. If he rejects it he does so only in the sense in which theologians have misrepresented freedom of will as being exempt from the law of causation. And in doing so he is certainly right in the face of Miss Bussey or any one who believes in a freedom of that kind, proclaiming that it is independent of causation.

There is no need of entering into the details of Miss Bussey's discussion. Any of our readers who knows Haeckel will be able to form his own judgment. Only a few points shall be mentioned here.

The universe has certainly to be explained from the highest

product its development achieves and not from its lowest beginnings. It is man that gives us the key to the appearance of the moner, while the moner will not be able to tell what its evolution will bring out in the end. On the other hand we have not solved the problem unless we trace the development of a rational being step by step in a mechanistic fashion of cause and effect. To deny it would mean to abolish science in spots. I prefer to keep my trust in science, for science to me is God's revelation. The most important step for instance is the development of reason, and it has been explained in a mechanistic sense by Ludwig Noiré when he shows how the origin of language has produced reason and not the reverse; or, to express his principle in a popular way, "We think because we speak" and not "we speak because we think." The mechanical mechanism of speech came first, and it was the mechanism of logic and grammar which has enabled us to think.

It is not a fault of Haeckel's if he holds the view that man explains the nature and significance of the moner. It proves that he is not onesided. His claim is but the natural consequence of a consideration of evolution.

The law of the conservation of matter and energy is an *a priori* law, which in its general meaning is similar to mathematical postulates. It is a demand of science and need not be proved in detail. It is a pre-supposition just as much as is the law of causation which the scientist assumes when he investigates natural phenomena. That there is a purpose in the universe is a proposition which would involve a belief that the universe as a whole is to be understood as an individual personal being after the fashion of a man. It would involve an anthropomorphic conception of God, and I doubt whether even among our theologians there are now many bold enough to take such a position. This, however, does not exclude that the universe in its processes follows a definite direction, a claim which is proved by the facts of evolution and is probably not denied by either a theistic or atheistic interpretation of the word.

Why the formulation of the theory of mechanicalism should be a fact which mechanicalism itself fails to explain is unintelligible, and why its own existence should be evidence of its own inadequacy is hard to understand, unless the notion of mechanicalism be narrowed to a limited field which does not include the entire construc-

tion of mechanicalism and its internal interrelations, such as for instance the interrelations of logical rules and conditions.

We may be able to uphold the theory of free will but we shall certainly not be able to deny the principle of determinism, and this is a blessing for the ethicist who preaches morality and claims that the freedom of will is essential for it, because if free will were indeed an exception to the law of causation and the will were undetermined and not changeable by education but remained a *tabula rasa* in spite of all attempts to change and improve it, or make it definite in the right direction, what would be the use of wasting our energies in promoting the welfare of mankind and eliminating evil influences? Let us be glad that determinism is true, for otherwise there would be no science, and principles of conduct would be a meaningless play of a misguided and erring imagination.

Haeckel apparently commits a very grave mistake. His opinions are "the result of the general presuppositions and prejudices of the age." He and many others "believe whatever fits in with their view of life and dismiss without a hearing anything which conflicts with it." Miss Bussey claims that "in this age of science the scientist has become the arbiter of all questions, and his view is commonly accepted as authoritative." In other words, we expect that science shall solve our problems, and we are prejudiced enough to bow down before science and accept its verdict. Haeckel for instance is so prejudiced that he believes in the universality of natural laws, and, says Miss Bussey, "It is a philosophic commonplace that laws resting on experience can be universalized only by means of the supposition of the uniformity of nature." It is a pity that Haeckel follows this fallacy and accepts the uniformity of nature, but the worst is that I too plead guilty. I believe not only in his "supposition of the uniformity of nature," but also in science with all that it implies, especially determinism which demands the determinedness of everything, even the determinedness of an unhampered and, in this sense, free will. I can not help it. I am in the same predicament as Professor Haeckel. May God have mercy on our souls!

EDITOR.

#### THE BELIEF IN GOD AND IMMORTALITY.

Professor James H. Leuba, professor psychology and pedagogy in Bryn Mawr College, has undertaken to write a book on *The Belief in God and Immortality*. It is not a proof or disproof